Deploy certificate Wi-Fi for your organization
Build an organization-owned WPA2/WPA3-Enterprise network using EAP-TLS, with a separate credential for each device. This guide is for administrators; people joining the Muse pilot should use the IrregularNet member guide and https://wifi.irregulars.io/. That portal currently serves the approved Muse pilot; it does not provision another organization’s CA, access points or enrollment realm.
Read the member guide’s certificate process and threat model first. The sequence below is a recommended deployment plan. Product-specific commands and policy hooks vary: use documentation matching your installed release, and prove acceptance before moving business devices.
Our implementation in the IrregularChat monorepo
Section titled “Our implementation in the IrregularChat monorepo”The service behind wifi.irregulars.io is maintained
in selfhost/irregularnet/ in the IrregularChat monorepo. It runs as Docker
Compose services: enrollment portal, FreeRADIUS and an identity-aware gateway.
- Browse our implementation on GitLab.
- Read our deployment and operations README.
- Track the implementation and rollout in MR !304.
The pilot implementation was merged into main through MR !304. These
source links follow main. The Muse pilot remains limited by the device and
connection-stability acceptance described in the README; merging its source
does not complete those checks. Repository access may require GitLab sign-in.
| Implementation area | Source |
|---|---|
| Service definitions and deployment entry point | docker-compose.yml, deploy.sh |
| Enrollment, SSO integration and device setup | portal/ |
| Identity-aware enrollment gateway | gateway/ |
| Verified-certificate access policy | radius/policy.py |
| PKI, membership, NAS and revocation operations | scripts/ |
| Policy, PKI and real EAP integration checks | tests/ |
Use this as a concrete reference alongside the upstream documentation below. If you intend to adapt this codebase for a new organization, first complete the independent-realm plan and worksheet. They identify the initial policy boundaries and the installer work still needed. The current integration contains Muse-specific realm, identity-provider and router assumptions. Reusing it for another organization requires reviewing and adapting those policies, hostnames, trust chains and NAS registration, then running the tests and physical acceptance plan. Generate your own private state and credentials; keep them outside Git. Router configuration and recovery remain in the separate Muse repository, as identified by the implementation README.
1. Define the policy and success criteria
Section titled “1. Define the policy and success criteria”Write down who owns issuance, approvals, outages and offboarding. Inventory access-point models/firmware, endpoint operating systems, MDM coverage and legacy equipment. Choose user-bound or device-bound enrollment and how you will record credential ownership. “One certificate per device” describes issuance; hardware binding needs an appropriate key store and provisioning path.
Set measurable requirements before buying or configuring anything:
- Allowed users/devices and the networks they may reach.
- Certificate lifetime, renewal lead time and the maximum tolerated access window after revocation, including an already connected client.
- Required OS versions, roaming, sleep/wake and pre-login networking.
- Availability target, a working management path and a rollback owner.
NIST SP 800-153 provides a WLAN lifecycle framework for configuration, assessment and monitoring. It predates WPA3; use current vendor documentation for protocol and device settings.
2. Choose an implementation path
Section titled “2. Choose an implementation path”| Path | Components | Work your organization still owns |
|---|---|---|
| Existing managed fleet | Organizational CA, MDM certificate deployment and enterprise RADIUS/NPS | Certificate templates, device/user mapping, profiles, revocation and access policy. Intune certificate overview |
| Self-hosted mixed-device deployment | FreeRADIUS, a CA/issuer, an enrollment service connected to your identity provider, and supported client installers | Integration, patching, policy, backups, support and the complete certificate lifecycle. FreeRADIUS / Let’s Wi-Fi |
| Managed certificate/RADIUS service | Provider-operated issuance/authentication plus your APs and device management | Trusted server names, device eligibility, network policy, retention, outage and vendor-exit plans. Test the same acceptance criteria. |
For self-hosting, useful upstream projects are FreeRADIUS, Let’s Wi-Fi, geteduroam and step-ca. These are components to evaluate, not a pre-integrated production appliance. Let’s Wi-Fi documents its supported branches and deployment assumptions; step-ca is a CA building block, not a Wi-Fi access-policy engine. Pin maintained releases, review release notes and test their interaction.
3. Allocate names and network boundaries
Section titled “3. Allocate names and network boundaries”Use your own domain and new pilot SSID. The values below are examples, not settings to paste into the Muse infrastructure.
| Item | Example | Required decision |
|---|---|---|
| Enrollment URL | https://wifi.example.org/ | HTTPS, identity-provider integration and enrollment permission |
| Authentication server identity | radius.example.org | Certificate DNS name and exact names allowed in client profiles |
| Pilot SSID | ExampleStaff-Pilot | Enterprise/EAP-TLS only; no password fallback |
| Client segment | A dedicated staff/client VLAN and subnet | Explicit allowed destinations, DNS/DHCP and denied management networks |
| RADIUS transport | Private AP/controller-to-server path | Register actual NAS sources and protect every hop |
| Administration | Separate trusted management access | Remains usable when Wi-Fi or the enrollment portal fails |
The enrollment hostname and RADIUS certificate name have different roles. A client normally reaches RADIUS through the AP’s EAP relay; the server name in its profile is a certificate check, not a requirement to publish RADIUS on the public internet.
Recommended boundary: expose the enrollment website over HTTPS; restrict RADIUS listeners to the AP/controller path; deny client-VLAN access to router, CA, identity-provider and management interfaces except explicitly required services. Check IPv6 and IPv4. Authentication does not create those firewall rules, and an identity-aware web proxy does not proxy UDP RADIUS.
4. Design certificate issuance and key custody
Section titled “4. Design certificate issuance and key custody”Use your existing organizational PKI or establish a protected root with a limited online issuer. Keep the root private key outside routine web-service operation, protect issuer keys, and test off-host recovery. Smallstep’s production CA guidance explains the root/issuer separation and HSM options.
Define separate certificate roles:
| Role | Baseline requirements |
|---|---|
| Server credential | Intended authentication-server DNS SAN, serverAuth EKU, matching private key and complete served chain |
| Client credential | Unique credential identity and serial, clientAuth EKU, approved issuer and an explicit account/device mapping |
| Client trust profile | Intended server CA/certificate anchors and expected server names; no approval of arbitrary replacement servers |
The role/EKU and platform constraints are documented in Microsoft’s EAP certificate requirements. NPS deployments also have directory mapping requirements; a working FreeRADIUS identity format is not automatically a valid NPS mapping.
Issuer templates should enforce leaf CA:false, allowed EKUs and authorized
identity fields. Do not blindly honor CSR-requested identity or CA extensions.
The certificate extension semantics are defined by RFC 5280.
Choose how the client key is created. Prefer device-generated, non-exportable keys on managed endpoints where supported and tested. SCEP/MDM issuance can provision unique credentials (Intune overview); hardware-backed storage and attestation require additional supported configuration. A portal that generates a downloadable PKCS#12/profile can be easier for BYOD, but its keys can be copied and its issuer becomes especially sensitive.
Give client and server issuance distinct scopes. Separate roots are one way to limit trust; constrained intermediates and strict purpose/issuer policies are another design to assess. Merely naming two issuers differently does not prevent cross-use. Start with a documented lifetime and renewal process that you can operate reliably; short expiry alone is not a revocation system.
5. Configure RADIUS to fail closed
Section titled “5. Configure RADIUS to fail closed”For a FreeRADIUS deployment, use the configuration shipped with the selected release. The 3.2 EAP module source documents the TLS configuration and cache options; the EAP-TLS tutorial describes enabling the method. Its demonstration certificates are explicitly unsuitable for production. Do not copy historical WEP examples into a modern Wi-Fi configuration.
Implement and review these decisions:
- Load the server key/chain and the intended client trust chain in the EAP-TLS configuration. Reject clients without a valid client certificate.
- Require TLS 1.2 or later; prefer TLS 1.3 where the tested client/server stack supports it. TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are deprecated.
- After cryptographic verification, authorize the verified certificate identity, issuer and serial against active organization/device policy. Reject missing, disabled, revoked, expired or wrong-organization records.
- Reject policy lookup failures. Do not grant access merely because the CA signed a certificate or because the outer username looks familiar.
- Apply equivalent authorization on resumed sessions, or initially disable TLS resumption until you have proved its behavior. AP PMK caching and fast roaming are separate cache paths to test.
- Register each actual AP/controller NAS source. For classic shared-secret RADIUS, use separately managed secrets per NAS where supported, protect their storage, and verify the deployed client/server integrity settings.
FreeRADIUS exposes a certificate policy hook; an enrollment portal does not automatically install that authorization policy. If using its issuance database, design an explicit supported read-only lookup rather than granting access to every certificate from the client CA.
RFC 9190 requires authorization to rely on authenticated information and explains resumption policy. The outer EAP identity is not a trusted account assertion. Revocation-status mechanisms such as CRL/OCSP and local active-device policy address different checks; define failure behavior and freshness for both.
Protect the AP-to-RADIUS path independently. RADIUS/TLS (RadSec) is one option when supported (RFC 6614, with modern TLS policy). A restricted encrypted private tunnel can protect classic UDP transport, but does not replace NAS authentication or application integrity checks. Patch both ends and follow current FreeRADIUS security guidance. Its BlastRADIUS notice distinguishes EAP-only/RadSec deployments from affected non-EAP cases; do not assume every RADIUS deployment has identical exposure.
Keep administration behind restricted identity-aware access; isolate its service account from CA root keys. Never expose enrollment/RADIUS databases, private keys or debug output as web downloads.
6. Configure one access point and pilot VLAN
Section titled “6. Configure one access point and pilot VLAN”Create the new SSID without replacing the existing production one. Select WPA3-Enterprise when your tested fleet supports the required mode, or a supported WPA2-Enterprise AES/CCMP configuration. Select EAP-TLS through the RADIUS policy; do not silently fall back to PEAP or a shared password.
Configure the RADIUS host, port and NAS credentials using the controller’s protected mechanism. Select the pilot VLAN/subnet and explicit firewall policy. For dynamic VLANs, verify both the RADIUS authorization result and the actual AP/controller VLAN assignment; an Access-Accept does not prove isolation.
Verify DHCP/DNS, time synchronization, reauthentication/key replacement, roaming and protected management-frame settings on the exact hardware and firmware. Keep guests and legacy/IoT equipment in separate restricted segments. MAC-address allowlisting is not a substitute for certificate authentication.
7. Deploy enrollment and client profiles
Section titled “7. Deploy enrollment and client profiles”For managed fleets, deploy trust, identity certificates and the Wi-Fi profile through the supported MDM path. Apple’s 802.1X guide describes certificate identities, trust and server-name controls; Windows EAP settings document server validation and profile configuration. Deploy trusted roots and identity profiles to the same intended devices before activating the connection.
For a self-service portal:
- Use your own HTTPS hostname and a dedicated identity-provider application. Limit enrollment to an explicit approved group and require appropriate MFA.
- Bind issued credentials to the authenticated account and intended organization; set limits, audit issuance and protect download responses/caches.
- Distribute a distinct credential per device and preserve the supplied server trust/name settings in every export format.
- Document renewal, device replacement and a lost-device contact. Keep another internet path available for enrollment and recovery.
Let’s Wi-Fi deployment notes discuss issuer compromise, portal/RADIUS access to issuance state and removal of departed users. Review those assumptions before choosing the component.
Concrete WPA2-Enterprise Linux pilot example
Section titled “Concrete WPA2-Enterprise Linux pilot example”Profile installers are preferable for supported users. For an administrator’s NetworkManager test laptop using WPA2-Enterprise AES/CCMP, first obtain its own certificate/key and the correct server CA through your approved issuer. Put these files in a protected local directory; these paths are placeholders, not downloadable example keys.
install -d -m 700 "$HOME/.local/share/example-wifi"# Install this device's files there through your approved enrollment process.chmod 600 "$HOME/.local/share/example-wifi/client.key"
nmcli connection add type wifi con-name ExampleStaff-Pilot \ ssid ExampleStaff-Pilot \ wifi-sec.key-mgmt wpa-eap \ wifi-sec.proto rsn \ wifi-sec.pairwise ccmp \ wifi-sec.group ccmp \ 802-1x.eap tls \ 802-1x.identity 'device-001@example.org' \ 802-1x.ca-cert "$HOME/.local/share/example-wifi/server-ca.pem" \ 802-1x.client-cert "$HOME/.local/share/example-wifi/client.pem" \ 802-1x.private-key "$HOME/.local/share/example-wifi/client.key" \ 802-1x.domain-match radius.example.org \ 802-1x.private-key-password-flags 2
nmcli --ask connection up ExampleStaff-PilotThis example fixes RSN and CCMP rather than accepting legacy WPA/cipher fallback. It is not a complete WPA3-Enterprise profile; use the required WPA3 settings for your tested platform. See wireless security properties.
This example needs permission to manage NetworkManager connections and files
accessible to its supplicant. domain-match constrains the server name;
private-key-password-flags 2 requests that the key passphrase not be saved.
Enter it through the prompt, not shell history. See the
802.1X property reference and secret flags.
Do not add a PEAP/MSCHAPv2 inner method to this EAP-TLS profile.
8. Prove acceptance before cutover
Section titled “8. Prove acceptance before cutover”Run these tests on every supported OS family and representative AP firmware. Use an authorized isolated pilot environment for negative tests, not a surprise rogue network alongside production.
| Test | Evidence to keep |
|---|---|
| Valid approved device | EAP succeeds, association completes, correct DHCP lease, DNS and a real application work over physical Wi-Fi |
| Untrusted CA or wrong server name | The client refuses authentication without a user bypass |
| Wrong issuer, wrong organization, unknown or expired client | RADIUS rejects; no usable client access |
| Revoked client | Fresh authentication fails, and an already connected/resumed/roaming device loses access within your stated limit |
| Network isolation | Positive control to a permitted destination; negative tests to management/staff resources over IPv4 and IPv6 |
| Reliability | Sleep/wake, repeated reauthentication, key replacement, roaming, AP reboot and backend recovery work |
| Outage | Issuer/database/RADIUS failure follows the documented denial and recovery policy; alternate management still works |
| Rollback | A rehearsed procedure restores the prior service without restoring revoked credentials to active status |
Configuration validation, a healthy process, an enrollment download and a RADIUS Access-Accept are useful intermediate results. None proves the complete user path. Avoid logging private keys, full profiles, session secrets or unnecessary personal data in the evidence.
9. Operate renewal, offboarding and recovery
Section titled “9. Operate renewal, offboarding and recovery”Maintain a credential inventory: owner/device identifier, issuer, serial, validity, status and audit event. Monitor server/client/intermediate expiry, renewal failures, authentication rejects, backup integrity and service health. Retain only the identity and network logs justified by your support/privacy needs.
Offboarding has two separate actions: prevent new issuance and invalidate existing credentials. Revoke the correct device or all relevant credentials, record the event, and check enforcement against connected and cached sessions. Use controller disconnect/reauthentication controls where supported and tested; record the measured access-loss time rather than promising instant revocation.
Back up CA/issuer state, authorization records, profiles/templates and router configuration in protected off-host storage. Treat revocations as data that must survive recovery. Do not restore an older “active” database over newer revocations. Stage server-certificate renewal before expiry; a root change requires client trust distribution and an overlap/cutover plan. If an issuer is compromised, follow the rehearsed trust-replacement procedure and replace affected credentials, not just the portal password.
Expand the pilot only after both authentication and these operating procedures pass. Keep an owner, review date and current source/version references in your own organization’s runbook.
References
Section titled “References”- RFC 5216: EAP-TLS.
- RFC 9190: TLS 1.3, authorization, revocation and resumption.
- RFC 8996: TLS 1.0/1.1 deprecation; RFC 6614: RADIUS/TLS.
- NIST SP 800-153: WLAN lifecycle guidance (2012).
- FreeRADIUS 3.2 tutorial, EAP module configuration, certificate policy and security notice.
- Microsoft EAP certificate requirements, Windows EAP settings and Intune certificate provisioning.
- Apple 802.1X deployment; NetworkManager properties and secret flags.
- Let’s Wi-Fi repository and deployment considerations.
- step-ca overview and production key protection.