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IrregularNet: certificate Wi-Fi

Start at https://wifi.irregulars.io/. IrregularNet uses a certificate for each device instead of a shared Wi-Fi password. Your IrregularChat account authorizes enrollment in the browser; your installed device certificate authenticates the Wi-Fi connection.

  1. Use an existing internet connection. Set up over mobile data or another working network before trying to join IrregularNet.
  2. Open wifi.irregulars.io on the device you want to enroll. Sign in with your approved IrregularChat account when prompted. Start from this address each time; do not reuse an old SSO redirect URL.
  3. Choose your operating system and download its profile. The portal’s device setup guide has current installers and import instructions.
  4. Install the profile using the instructions below. Each device should enroll separately; do not copy another person’s or another device’s profile.
  5. Select IrregularNet in Wi-Fi settings. Keep server certificate validation enabled. The expected authentication server is radius.irregulars.io; the profile supplies its trusted CA and server name.
  6. Check the connection. Open a website and confirm the device remains on IrregularNet. Report repeated disconnects to the operator, even if the first connection succeeds.
  1. From the setup guide, install the official geteduroam application for your Intel/AMD or ARM PC.
  2. Download your .eap-config profile from the enrollment portal.
  3. Open that file with geteduroam and approve the IrregularNet configuration. If an import passphrase is requested, use the one shown by the portal.
  4. Connect to IrregularNet in Windows Wi-Fi settings.

Import the downloaded file. Muse is not an eduroam institution to select in an institution search, and this pilot does not provide eduroam roaming access. Do not enter your IrregularChat password into a generic Wi-Fi password prompt.

  1. Install the official geteduroam Linux client using the links in the setup guide.

  2. Download your .eap-config profile and open it with geteduroam, or import it with the CLI, replacing the filename with your actual download:

    Terminal window
    geteduroam-cli --local "$HOME/Downloads/your-profile.eap-config"
  3. Approve the NetworkManager connection, then connect to IrregularNet.

This client requires NetworkManager. If your system uses standalone iwd or wpa_supplicant, ask the operator for a reviewed setup. Preserve the supplied CA and server-name checks when configuring any alternative client.

  1. Choose the Apple option in the portal and download your .mobileconfig.
  2. Open the downloaded profile and finish installing it in System Settings / Settings → General → Device Management (the wording varies by OS version).
  3. If replacing an older IrregularNet profile, approve the replacement through the normal system settings. Then select IrregularNet in Wi-Fi settings.

Downloading alone does not install a profile. If it remains pending, open the system’s profile installation screen and complete the installation there.

Install the official geteduroam app using the Android setup instructions. Download your .eap-config in the browser, open it with geteduroam and approve the IrregularNet configuration. Then connect to IrregularNet.

Use the ChromeOS setup instructions to download the .onc network profile and import it through ChromeOS’s network configuration import interface. Then select IrregularNet.

  • The downloaded profile contains a private Wi-Fi credential. Keep it private; do not post it in chat, attach it to a support ticket or commit it to Git.
  • Pilot certificates currently last 30 days. Return to wifi.irregulars.io to enroll a replacement before expiry; automatic renewal is not currently provided.
  • If a device is lost, a profile is shared accidentally, or access should end, contact the operator to revoke the issued certificate. Removing a profile from one device does not revoke copies elsewhere.
  • Keep the supplied server CA and expected server name. Do not select “Do not validate” or bypass a browser certificate warning.

Wi-Fi administrators can search Wi-Fi administration by IrregularChat name, username or email. Choose moves to that member’s certificates. A member can have several certificates for different devices.

Active, Pending, Revoked and Expired certificates appear in separate groups with text status badges and different colors. Filter by status or choose History for revoked and expired records. Sorting applies within each group; creation date, expiry, certificate number and latest revocation are available. Filters apply before pagination. Choosing another member resets the view.

History is a display grouping; it does not archive or delete certificates. Revocation still requires a reason, review and fresh sign-in. It denies the certificate at the next authentication and may not disconnect a device that is already online.

What you seeNext step
Access denied during sign-inConfirm you are using the approved account; ask the operator to check pilot enrollment permission.
An old SSO link failsStart again at https://wifi.irregulars.io/ rather than a saved SAML redirect.
ERR_SSL_PROTOCOL_ERROR with :80 in the addressUse https://wifi.irregulars.io/ with no :80.
A downloaded profile is pendingComplete installation in system settings or the appropriate importer; downloading is a separate step.
Wi-Fi asks for a shared password or username/passwordCheck that the IrregularNet certificate profile is installed and selected. This network uses WPA2-Enterprise / EAP-TLS, not a shared password or PEAP password login.
Server certificate warningStop and contact the operator. Do not disable CA or server-name validation.
Connected briefly, then disconnected or switched networksReport the OS, time and visible error to the operator. Initial enrollment does not prove the pilot connection is stable.
Certificate expiredRe-enroll at the portal and install the replacement profile.

There are two trust decisions: who may enroll and which credential may join Wi-Fi. A successful browser login does not itself authorize a radio connection. EAP-TLS is the certificate authentication method carried by 802.1X; RADIUS is the service the access point asks for the decision. See the EAP-TLS specification and FreeRADIUS overview.

A certificate binds an identity to a public key and is signed by a certificate authority (CA). The matching private key is the secret. The device proves it can use that key during TLS; it does not transmit the private key to the access point. Copying a public certificate alone is not enough to authenticate. Copying the certificate and private key can be. This distinction follows the EAP-TLS authentication model.

Three credentials have different jobs:

CredentialWhat it provesWho holds its private key
Enrollment website HTTPS certificateThe browser reached the intended websiteWebsite/gateway operator
RADIUS server certificateThe device reached its expected Wi-Fi authentication serverAuthentication service
Client certificateThe connecting device can use an enrolled credentialDevice; exportable issuance can also involve the enrollment service

A website certificate for ncmuse.co is not a client Wi-Fi credential. The client profile trusts the server CA and expected name radius.irregulars.io. Server and client certificates also need the appropriate extended key usage: server authentication and client authentication, respectively. Microsoft’s certificate requirements explain these separate roles.

flowchart TD
    B[Browser with existing internet] -->|HTTPS sign-in| P[Enrollment portal]
    P -->|SSO and enrollment permission| I[Identity provider]
    P -->|Private device profile| D[Device certificate and key]
    D -->|802.1X EAP-TLS| A[Access point]
    A -->|Protected RADIUS path| R[Authentication service]
    R --> C[Certificate checks and active enrollment policy]
    C -->|Accept or reject| A
    A -->|Wi-Fi key establishment after acceptance| N[Configured network access]
  1. Enrollment: the portal checks the approved account, issues a client credential and supplies the connection settings. This is the workflow implemented by Let’s Wi-Fi; profile import is a separate step.
  2. Mutual authentication: the device validates the server; the server validates the client’s certificate and proof of private-key possession. The access point relays the exchange. EAP-TLS provides the cryptographic authentication, not a browser captive-portal click.
  3. Authorization: IrregularNet additionally checks the verified credential against its active issuance record, including issuer, serial and business realm. A certificate being signed by a trusted CA is not the whole policy. FreeRADIUS supports policy rejection of otherwise valid certificates.
  4. Network access: after acceptance, Wi-Fi key establishment and the configured subnet policy apply. DHCP, DNS, internet access and isolation still need independent checks. FreeRADIUS’s tutorial explicitly distinguishes EAP authentication from obtaining an IP address.

Those IrregularNet implementation details describe the October 18 pilot. Its server and client issuance use separate trust chains; profiles trust the server chain. Its downloadable credentials are generated server-side and are exportable. Per-device issuance does not mean the key is hardware-bound.

AdvantageWhat has to be true
No shared Wi-Fi password to circulateEach device receives its own credential; profiles are not shared.
No reusable account password in the Wi-Fi authentication exchangeEAP-TLS is actually selected, rather than a password method. Browser enrollment still needs a secure account.
The device authenticates the serverThe profile enforces its trusted CA and expected server name without user overrides.
One device can lose access without rekeying everyoneThe operator can identify and revoke its credential, and the access policy checks that state.
Better ownership and audit recordsIssuance records map credentials to approved accounts/devices, with protected logs and retention limits. They do not prove which human used an unlocked device.

The server-validation condition matters on every OS: an SSID is only a name. Microsoft documents server validation and rogue-network risks; Apple documents trusted certificates and server names; NetworkManager warns that omitting the CA permits interception (802.1X settings).

Protocol version matters too. EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 adds encrypted certificate exchange and stronger identity-privacy properties. This does not establish that every pilot connection negotiated TLS 1.3, or hide all radio metadata. Authorization and session-resumption rules must also be enforced. These are specific properties discussed in RFC 9190, not consequences of the “Enterprise” label alone.

The assets are device private keys, issuance authority, account access, authorization records and the networks behind the access points. We assume an attacker can observe radio traffic, advertise a copied SSID or obtain a lost device. The CA, enrollment service, identity provider, RADIUS service and registered access points are trusted components that need their own protection. The following is a deployment risk analysis, not a claim that every mitigation has passed physical acceptance in the Muse pilot.

ThreatControlRemaining risk or limit
Fake SSID and authentication serverEnforce the supplied CA and expected server name. Server validationA malicious profile can change trust; a compromised authorized AP remains a trusted infrastructure component.
Stolen or copied profileSeparate credentials, protected storage and prompt revocationExportable keys can be cloned. A certificate is not device attestation or proof of the person holding the device.
Compromised enrollment accountRestricted enrollment and strong MFA on the identity providerAn attacker who passes enrollment may receive a legitimate new credential. MFA at enrollment does not make every Wi-Fi reconnect a fresh MFA event.
Departed member or lost laptopDisable fresh enrollment and revoke issued credentialsAccount/group removal alone may leave existing certificates usable. Removing a local profile does not invalidate a copy.
Stale authorization after revocationRecheck policy and test cached/resumed sessions. RFC 9190 authorization/resumptionRevocation is not a guaranteed immediate disconnect; measure its effect on connected devices and roaming.
Compromised client issuerSeparate issuance roles, limited privileges and an issuer-recovery plan. CA key protectionClient issuance compromise can mint client credentials; a separate server trust chain limits one impersonation route but does not restore trust automatically.
Compromised AP, gateway or enrolled endpointSegmentation, endpoint security and application-layer encryptionEAP-TLS does not make the endpoint clean, authorize every internal resource or protect traffic beyond the Wi-Fi encryption boundary.
RF interference or backend outageMonitoring, supported hardware and recovery accessCertificates do not prevent jamming, every disconnect attack or service failure. NIST WLAN guidance treats wireless security as an operational lifecycle.

Wi-Fi authentication also does not provide anonymity. The network operator can associate activity with enrollment records; radio identifiers and traffic patterns may remain visible. Use the minimum identifiers needed and protect support captures. TLS 1.3’s narrower privacy guarantees are described in RFC 9190’s privacy section.

For administrators, use the separate deployment guide for your own organization. It covers CA design, RADIUS policy, onboarding, segmentation, revocation tests and recovery without relying on Muse’s deployment settings.

wifi.irregulars.io is backed by the IrregularChat monorepo’s selfhost/irregularnet/ implementation. The deployment README documents the portal, FreeRADIUS, identity-aware gateway, certificate policy, tests and operations. For reuse, follow the organization guide.

MR !304 merged the pilot implementation into main. The source links follow main; the README records remaining device and connection-stability acceptance. Merging the source does not complete those pilot checks. GitLab may require sign-in to view the source.

Recent changes

  1. docs(irregularnet): add community hosting paths and rollout roadmap gitayam
  2. Improve Wi-Fi administrator navigation and certificate groups sac
  3. feat(irregularnet): add Muse certificate Wi-Fi pilot sac
  4. docs(wiki): link the IrregularNet monorepo implementation @sac
  5. docs(wiki): explain certificate Wi-Fi security and deployment @sac