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Supply Chain

The adversary compromises something upstream of you — a library, a package, an update server, a hardware vendor, an app store listing — so that you install hostile code through what you believe is a legitimate channel. By the time the trust chain reaches you, the attack already happened.

  • Hijacked software updates — SolarWinds, 3CX, NotPetya (M.E.Doc). The vendor’s update channel itself is compromised.
  • Malicious npm/PyPI packages — typosquats (react-doom), dependency confusion, abandoned-package takeover.
  • Trojanized CMA forks — sideloaded “Signal Plus” / “Telegram X” variants with bundled spyware. Particularly common in regions where official app stores are blocked.
  • Hardware supply chain — interdicted shipments, factory-implanted firmware. Rare in consumer scenarios; more common against journalists/dissidents at borders.
  • Compromised browser extensions — extension sold to a new owner who pushes a malicious update to the existing install base.
  • Tampered installers — fake “official” download mirrors hosting modified binaries.