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Volunteer your bandwidth to people under censorship

This page is for members with a laptop, a home server or an Android phone who want to help people in censored countries get online. Most options take a few minutes and none of them make you a Tor exit.

People in Iran, Russia, China and elsewhere reach the open internet through proxies that volunteers run. Censors block known addresses, so the network needs a steady supply of new ones, and a home connection or a cheap server is exactly that.

The Tor Project’s December 2025 review of censorship in Iran and Russia (Staying ahead of censors in 2025) says that Snowflake is the most used traffic obfuscation tool in Iran, and that WebTunnel has become a key tool for users in Russia. It asks readers to help by running their own Snowflake, and, if they have a website, a WebTunnel bridge.

OptionEffortWhat you needWho it helpsRisk to you
Snowflake in your browserTwo minutesFirefox, Chrome or Edge, left openTor users who connect with SnowflakeLow
Snowflake standaloneUnder an hourA machine that runs 24/7: home server or VPSThe same people, with more capacity and uptimeLow
Psiphon ConduitFive minutesAn Android phone, ideally plugged in on Wi-FiPsiphon usersLow
Tor bridge or non-exit relayAn evening, plus upkeepA VPS you control, with a public addressTor users (bridge: those where Tor is blocked)Low to moderate: the address can be blocklisted

In every option above, the sites people visit never see your address, and you can’t see what they’re doing: their traffic is encrypted end to end.

Snowflake is a Tor Project extension that turns your browser into a short-lived proxy. Someone in a censored country is matched with your browser, connects to it over WebRTC (the same technology video calls use), and your browser passes their already-encrypted Tor traffic on to a Tor bridge.

Install it:

  1. Open snowflake.torproject.org and click Install for Firefox, Install for Chrome or Install for Edge (Edge uses the Chrome Web Store).
  2. The first time, the extension shows its privacy notice. Read it and click I consent.
  3. Click the Snowflake icon and make sure Enabled is switched on. The Tor Project’s browser proxy guide says you can toggle Enabled to turn it off and on.
  4. Leave the browser open. The popup shows how many people are connected now and how many you’ve helped in the last 24 hours.

In Chrome and Edge the popup also offers Keep running when the browser is closed. Firefox doesn’t support the permission this needs, so in Firefox the proxy runs only while the browser is open (checked in the extension’s source).

If the popup says WebRTC feature is not detected, a privacy setting or another extension has turned WebRTC off, and Snowflake can’t run in that browser.

What it uses: some of your upload and download bandwidth while people are connected. The Tor Project doesn’t publish a typical figure; if you’re on a metered connection, switch it off when you need the bandwidth.

The risk is low:

  • You’re not an exit. The extension’s own notice says the people you help browse with the address of their Tor exit, not yours. Sites they visit never see you.
  • The person you help sees your IP address while they’re connected, because WebRTC connects the two of you directly. Connections are brief and come from random users.
  • The Snowflake broker sees your IP address, your NAT type and how many people you’re serving. The notice says this is used to set up connections and for aggregate statistics, and isn’t stored.
  • The extension says it is for people whose own internet is not heavily censored. If you’re in a censored country, use Snowflake to connect, not to volunteer.

Snowflake standalone on a home server or VPS

Section titled “Snowflake standalone on a home server or VPS”

A standalone Snowflake proxy is the same thing without a browser: a small program that runs around the clock. The Tor Project says standalone proxies offer more bandwidth and are more reliable for users behind restrictive networks (standalone guide).

Pick an install method from the standalone guide:

  • Docker: the Docker guide downloads the Tor Project’s docker-compose.yml and starts it with docker compose up -d snowflake-proxy. Check it with docker logs -f snowflake-proxy.
  • Debian package: sudo apt install snowflake-proxy, then enable and start the snowflake-proxy service (Debian guide). The guide warns that the package may be out of date.
  • Other ways: an Ansible role, FreeBSD, or building from source; all are linked from the standalone guide.

Two notes on the Docker setup:

  • The compose file uses host networking (network_mode: host), because the proxy needs a wide range of UDP ports.
  • It also starts Watchtower, which checks for a new Snowflake image every day and installs it. Watchtower gets the Docker socket, which is the same as root on that machine. On a server that also runs other things, you may prefer to remove the Watchtower service and update by hand (docker compose pull, then up -d) every few weeks.

NAT matters. The guide recommends a connection with no NAT or unrestricted NAT, with incoming UDP allowed on the system’s ephemeral port range (or a range you set with the -ephemeral-ports-range option). Many home routers use a restrictive NAT; a proxy behind one still works but can serve fewer users. Most VPSs have a public address with no NAT, which is why a small VPS makes a good Snowflake. The guide links a NAT behavior test tool if you want to check.

The risk is the same as the browser version: you’re not an exit, and the people you help see your address while connected.

Conduit is Psiphon’s volunteer app. It turns your device into a Conduit Station that relays traffic for people using Psiphon, a circumvention app used in many censored countries.

Where to get it: Google Play for Android, the Microsoft Store for Windows, and a macOS download, all linked from Conduit’s download page. There’s no iPhone app yet. On Linux there’s a command-line version in Psiphon’s source repository. At the time of writing the macOS download is a release candidate, not a final release.

What it does, from the Conduit FAQ: your station is “a transport relay, not an exit point”, it is not a VPN, and traffic through it is encrypted end to end, so you can’t see what people do. It runs in the background. The station can see the IP addresses of the people who connect, and they connect to yours.

Limit what it uses. Data through your station counts against your plan, and the FAQ recommends running it on Wi-Fi or a fixed line, with the phone plugged in. The app’s settings (names checked in the app’s English text):

  • Max Public Peers: how many people can use your station at once.
  • Max MB/s Per Peer: how much bandwidth each person can use.
  • Reduced Usage Window: lower limits during a daily window you set (Start time, End time), for example during the day “when you need your bandwidth and battery to last”.

The current app has no Wi-Fi-only switch that we could find in its settings or source. If you’re on a capped mobile plan, turn the station off (Turn Off) when you leave Wi-Fi, or use your phone’s own per-app setting to block Conduit from mobile data. That setting’s name and place differ between Android phones, so we haven’t named it here.

The risk is low. The FAQ says a station is not an exit node, and that responsibility for what people do online usually rests with them. It also says some governments restrict proxies and circumvention tools, so check your own country’s rules.

If you’re comfortable running a server, a bridge or a non-exit (guard or middle) relay gives the Tor network long-lived capacity. Follow the Tor Project’s own guides:

  • Relay operations, and Types of relays to choose one.
  • obfs4 bridge setup, per operating system or with Docker. A bridge needs 24/7 connectivity, open TCP ports, and at least 1 Mbit/s each way (requirements).
  • WebTunnel bridge setup, the kind the Tor Project says matters in Russia. It needs a website you host, a domain you control, a valid TLS certificate, and at least 1 GB of RAM (4 GB recommended).
  • A guard or middle relay needs at least 10 Mbit/s, 100 GB of traffic a month each way, a public IPv4 address, and ideally 24/7 uptime (same requirements page).

Run it on your own VPS, not at home. Be plain with yourself about this:

  • Relay addresses are public. The Tor Project says the addresses of guard, middle and exit relays are published, and some services block them. Run one on your home connection and your household may start hitting blocks and CAPTCHAs.
  • Bridge addresses aren’t published, but they aren’t secret either. They’re handed out to users, and censors and scanners collect them. Treat a bridge’s address as one that will end up on blocklists.
  • So never run either on a home connection you share with family or housemates, and never on an address you also use for other services (your mail, your website, your VPN). Give it a VPS and an address of its own.

The Tor Project is more relaxed and suggests a bridge or a Snowflake for people at home with a single address. If you want to help from home, a standalone Snowflake is the safer choice.

  • Don’t run a Tor exit. Exit traffic leaves through your address, and abuse complaints go to you. The Tor Project says not to run an exit from home at all, and to be ready for legal notices and law-enforcement inquiries (requirements). Leave exits to organizations set up for it.
  • Don’t run an open proxy or VPN for strangers on your home address. Anything a stranger does through it looks like it came from you. Snowflake, Conduit and bridges are different: they only carry encrypted traffic onward to the Tor or Psiphon network.
  • Don’t install brand-new releases on day one. Use the projects’ stable packages and give a new version a few days unless it’s a security fix. That includes release candidates such as the current Conduit macOS build.
  • Don’t post your bridge line publicly. If you share it with people you know, give each their own line; see Using a private Tor bridge.
  • Don’t volunteer from inside a censored country. These options are for people on an uncensored connection. If you’re the one being censored, use them to connect instead.

Recent changes

  1. docs(wiki): volunteer your bandwidth to people under censorship @sac